

# GUIDE TO THE USE OF INFORMATION MATERIALS

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MATERIALS

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# FOREWORD

This pamphlet is an outline of principles to govern the use of ideas so that they may become more effective weapons in the war.

The propaganda of the enemy is rooted in falsehood. He has so stated it. Nor could his policy have been otherwise. Had the truth been told, there would have been no cause for war. Were it spoken now by the enemy, his forces would soon lack the will to fight. In the beginning, falsehood has helped him gain certain military successes, and it will continue to help him so far as we fail to recognize it. But in the end it will be one of the major causes of his undoing.

Therefore, the truth fights on our side. But, as with every other force and weapon in the conflict, it is essential that we learn how to make the wisest use of it. Only so will victory be made certain.

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## *Truth and Falsehood*

The fundamental principle of American information about the war is that we will speak the truth. But, as in all other matters pertaining to security in wartime, common sense must be exercised, and common sense is action according to circumstances and not according to rules. To speak the truth is not enough; there must be a steadying judgment as to when it should be spoken, and to whom it should be addressed.

A truth need not only be well-rounded, but the utterance of it should take account of the stresses and objectives of the moment. Truth becomes falsehood unless it has the strength of perspective. The presentation of facts is self-justifying only when the facts are developed in their true proportion. Said the soldier Cromwell to the artist doing his portrait: "Yes, paint the wart on my nose, but do not make my whole nose a wart."

It is not intended to imply that in the supplying of information about the war, it is possible to avoid risk, or desirable to seek always the perfectly safe course. All action in war that is aimed at any positive end involves the weighing of one set of risks against another, and judgment resides in choosing the line of action which is most likely to serve the general purpose. This is true of information service as of any other. Information which does not inform, counsel, warn, stimulate, remind, instruct, or reiterate for the purpose of training the mind for war, is innocuous and therefore of no value to the military service.

It should be recognized that news is not the sacred property of the press, but something in the public domain. In time of war the Armed Forces themselves are creators of news and have therefore a vested interest in the way it is reported and edited by Information services. The all-important question pertaining to news and information is how victory can best be expedited by the truthful use of news. The truth works for our side.

There is never any justification, in any circumstances, for the employment of material which is known to be false. The editorial rule—when in doubt, leave it out—holds good. When information appears to be valid and useful, but has not been wholly authenticated, it is best stated as such. But that which is known to be false or is only vaguely rumored is to be avoided.

For a short while only can morale be stimulated by the dope of a false propaganda. Then like a drug, the more the victim swallows, the more has to be prescribed. Finally, it ceases to work at all. In war there is no substitute for military victory. Combat is not magic; wishful thinking is. Therefore it becomes the soldier to look at war through the eyes of a soldier and not through those of the magician.

If battles could be won by large type and overstatement, there would soon be no soldiers left in the world. The injunction of the Apostle Paul: "Let all things be done decently and in order," is a counsel of strength through moderation which is not to be lost on those who are shaping the thinking of military personnel.

The retort courteous of the 1918 Army: "Altogether boys! some etc." is the inevitable response of the American soldier to boastfulness, windiness, and empty talk. The essence of success in a doctrine which is based upon truth is to be found in emphasis upon the fundamental justice of the national cause and a proper reckoning of the odds in the present struggle. Our case will not be helped by lies or distortions.

## *War Aims*

The war aim of the Armed Forces of the United States is the total defeat of the Axis Powers. It was agreed at the Casablanca conference that there would be no terms to the Axis short of unconditional surrender. Thus, in shaping the attitude of the Armed Forces, there is no room for discussion of anything short of total military victory over the enemy. Short of this goal "peace feelers" do not interest us.

## *Peace Aims*

The force of the arms of the United States is being directed toward putting an end to the rule of gangsterism in international affairs, and equally toward the reestablishing of order in the world society and the restoration of law as the rule of action in the intercourse of nations. *We fight to preserve for our own people and for people throughout the world the chance to learn or to continue learning how to govern themselves and how to live with one another.*

Toward that end, it is of supreme importance not only that the Armed Forces of the United States be kept mindful of the war aims of Nation, but that they be counseled to such fullness of understanding of the world in which they live and self-discipline of spirit on behalf of their country, that they will be able and zealous to discharge their dual responsibility as citizen-soldiers in the immediate post-war period.

The men and women of the United States Army should know better



than any, or instruction should inform them, that the only possible justification for war is the fashioning of a less imperfect peace; also that military victories are indeed meaningless if the peace arrangements built upon them satisfy the victor less than the arrangements that led up to the war. Such arrangements must eventuate in an organization of both local and world society which seeks to be constructive rather than destructive, for such is the definition of peace.

The attainment of such an organization is one-half of the mission of the United States Army. The military half of its mission is discharged with arms; the responsibilities of the peace are to be met in terms of foresightful citizenship which include frank recognition of the nature of military power in the modern world and what that power implies for the future peace and welfare of the United States and of the world. In point are the words of the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall: "I think we have got to compress theories with realities. We will have to bear in mind the inevitable human reactions of the post-war aversion to military matters and of the taxpayers' passion to reduce military expenditures. We will have to take the nations of the world as they are, the prejudices and passions of the people as they exist, and, with those considerations, develop a method so that we can have a free America in a peaceful world." We must not only build our security but keep it secure.

## *The Armed Forces and the Nation*

The men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States are citizens of a democracy. They, like the government, are the servants of the people. Were they to become its masters, democracy would perish. In time, the majority will be returned to civil life and will have the same privileges and duties as other citizens. They will exert political force according to the validity and vigor of their political ideas. They should not expect to do more than that. Hence irresponsible talk about the political implications of the growing strength of the Armed Forces, epitomized in such phrases as "this Army will return some day and run the country," is only for those who have not yet taken an accurate measure of their wartime responsibility. It is not a proper subject for those who are conditioning the thinking of military personnel. The Army is serving the people; not expecting to dominate them.

## *Change and Understanding*

Not only the best trained, best equipped, but also the best informed Army in the world: this expressed aim makes plain the mission of those responsible for informing the soldier of the United States. This definition makes clear the *military* alliance between training, supply, and

information for the soldier. Information at all levels is an indispensable item in his mental equipment. The task of orienting him to the realities of the world he lives in comprises two broad areas: First, the war, its causes, issues, and progress; second, organized life as it changes under the vast pressures of war's energy.

In a certain sense, the soldier at war freezes in his mind the civil world of home which he left to join the Army. All during his service, it is that fixed image of home which he remembers and looks forward to on his discharge. But something he does not consciously count on is happening at home—the heavy demands of the war on the civilian front are changing many of the faces and conditions of life there. These changes come to seem natural to those at home whom they currently affect. Without his preparation for them, they will seem abrupt and bewildering to the returned soldier. Army information services should be alive to the evolutions and new ways on the home front, and share them with the armed forces.

The time calls for the United States soldier to think positively on these subjects rather than to take a negative attitude. To help him do so is to emphasize the nature of the world in which we live, with its changes in ways of war, new inventions and technologies, the shrinkage of distances, all of which bring closer than ever before the nature of opposing ideologies. Democracy—the source of our conviction—faces competing ideas at close quarters in this new world. To understand his own national faith in relation to competing ideas is the United States soldier's right, and more, his duty. For the very future for which he fights cannot come into being unless he will be well enough informed as a citizen to carry out that which he fought for as a soldier.

## *Equality of Arms and Services*

The equal importance of all arms and services in the victory formula is to be understood and respected at all times as a working principle by information service personnel, not as a matter of adherence to a military doctrine but because it is common sense and consistent with a true understanding of war. The maintenance of this principle need not entail any sacrifice of the esprit which comes of a soldier's pride in his own service. But to inspire any arm generally with a contempt for any other arm, while it may give a temporary lift to morale, will assuredly lead to a relaxation of those precautions which alone can guard it from surprise by the enemy.

## *Offensive and Defensive*

While it is necessary to inspire troops with an eagerness for action and a desire to carry the war against the enemy, a well-rounded con-

cept of the nature of war begins with the understanding that the offensive and defensive are equal halves of the whole plan, that final success comes from the balancing of arms around these two central ideas, in their reciprocal relationship, and that troops acting on the defensive are not therefore to be considered in an inferior position to those engaged in offensive action. Today's defensive may be the offensive of tomorrow.

Only a small part of war involves actual fighting. But the larger part is ill-conceived of as a mere period of waiting for the moment of combat to arrive. Stages of training and preparation are anything but passive periods in the over-all fight. Certain troops, because of the essential limitations of their mission, may seldom or never come into actual fighting contact with the enemy. They should not be allowed to think less of themselves for that; nor should battle troops be allowed to think less of them. Within the organization of a battling army there is no unimportant job and no room for fixed degrees of job importance. "For the want of a nail a shoe was lost \* \* \*." Let all troops be kindled with an understanding of each outfit's indispensable place in the military scheme of things. At all stages and in all situations it is a function of information services to help vitalize the soldier with a strong consciousness of his personal responsibility in relation to the nature and importance of the mission of his particular branch or outfit.

## *Conduct of the War*

It is neither the privilege nor the duty of any personnel connected with Army information services to dispute current military policy and strategy, or to advise superior commanders about military operations, or to cavil about the manner in which troops are being employed, or to express disagreement with what is being done by the military or the political leadership either of the United States or of the United Nations. Information—not criticism.

## *Past Military Policy*

The Armed Forces of the United States are to be considered receptive to discussion of the elements of background in our national military policy. The presentation of such material should be at all times reasonable, dispassionate, and conditioned by an awareness that the major weaknesses in our past military policy had their origins in our historical and traditional belief in our own ocean-guarded immunity from attack. The soldier is not expected to deny or ignore

the political and economic implications of isolationism, but the soundest manner of presenting the question to him is to point out that because of American indifference to military problems and to the national defense situation, what should have been a technical problem was permitted to become a political issue. Matters of fact are not to be confused with matters of opinion. The national defense must be considered a subject of commanding importance to men and women of the Army and the providing of information which will stimulate active interest in the problem is to be desired at all times. The truth about the past carries over into the present.

## *Military Targets*

All warfare is retaliation, all acts of war are reprisals, and everything appertaining to the enemy is a military objective. Consequently, such expressions as "reprisal raids" or "retaliatory measures" may be all right for civilians but they are not for soldiers. The "eye-for-an-eye" principle is old testament doctrine. In war's new testament, if your enemy shoots your toe, you shoot his head.

## *Weapons*

Confidence in his weapons being one of the chief supports of the fighting man, nothing will be said by information services to shatter or disturb that confidence.

## *The Home Front*

1. The Armed Forces of the United States are entitled to an objective, impartial, and editorially accurate presentation of news developments along the home front. The purpose of such presentations is to inform and not to incite.

2. Information of such character that it is likely to add to the discontent or homesickness or sense of frustration of troops is to be handled with the extreme of discretion, it being kept in mind that among the primary purposes of information service to the armed forces are the strengthening of discipline and the upbuilding of morale, and that these purposes are thwarted where ire and resentment are directed against social and political forces within the interior. Make soldiers, not malcontents.

3. Information within a nation which is benefited by a free press is not edited as if there were constant danger that the citizen would become chagrined and rebellious at the discovery that his country is not

Utopia. Nor should it be so edited for the armed forces of that nation. The growth of democracy—indeed, the preservation of it—is dependent upon men looking squarely at its imperfections as well as its virtues and strengths. Only a naive minority finds it necessary to believe that present democracy is the “best of all possible worlds,” and those who believe otherwise do not draw assurance from being kept in the dark. Yet in the treatment of all materials pertaining to the state of the nation, personnel supplying information to the armed forces should be guided not only by the degree of interest of the audience in the subject presented, but, equally, by the probable effect of the presentation upon the audience. Under a free press, the civilian editor frequently finds it advisable to delete or eliminate material because of considerations of public policy. Those who supply information to the armed forces have need of vastly greater powers of discrimination and judgment. An army is more coherent, it possesses greater unified power and vastly more efficient channels of person-to-person communication than any other body. The words of G. F. R. Henderson are in point: “Every army has an individuality of its own. It is a living organism of a very sensitive temper; and it can neither be controlled nor efficiently directed except by those who are in full sympathy with its every impulse.” In the supplying of news to a civilian audience, the question of the impact of the information upon those receiving it is usually of minor consideration. Within the armed forces it is vital that all information be examined in this light. Feel everything with a soldier’s feelings.

4. It is a reasonable presumption that troops are interested in news of labor, including reports of strikes, labor disputes, etc., where such events are of a magnitude to have national interest or of such character as to influence the lot of the fighting man. Certainly the story that manpower is due to be drafted for war factory service is information of a type which is calculated to make the average individual in military service more contented with his lot. But the good must be reported with the bad. It would be false to presume that the armed forces are interested in unfavorable information but derive no benefit from that which is positive and favorable. Pride of home is a soldier’s motive.

5. In general, information dealing with the difficulties on the home front which result from the stresses of the war, such as gasoline rationing, food rationing, increased taxes, and longer hours, is of especial interest to the man in service and provides an uplift to his own feeling about the war, rather than otherwise. News of total war can come only from home.

6. No good purpose is served by plying the soldier with information emphasizing the prevalence of high wages or extraordinary profits or other data tending to show that he is carrying an excessive share of the

burden of the war, or that civilian forces on the whole are not cooperating, or that certain economic or social groups are slipping into special favor. The harmfulness of such generalizations is likely to offset whatever truth they may contain. Soldiers are naturally apt to think they are doing more than anyone else to win the war, and this idea is plentifully supported by outside agencies. But there is no scrupulous method whereby civilian abuses can be weighed in the balance against such equivalent soldier shortcomings as goldbricking and malingering. Sound editorial judgment will find the right proportions of emphasis and restraint without resort to any kind of censor.

7. News of political developments, elections, etc., is to be handled as is warranted by the interest of the armed forces in the subject matter, and within the provisions of the Soldier Voting Law (P. L. 277, 78th Congress), as amended by P. L. 418. War Department policy with regard to the operation of Army information media under the law has three main provisions, as follows:

(a) If the Army rebroadcasts a "political address" it must give equal time if requested for such purposes to representatives of each political party having a Presidential candidate in at least six states. No direct relaying or rebroadcasting of a "political address" will be made by the Army, except by or in accordance with prior approval obtained from Information and Education Division, ASF; (b) With regard to servicemen's publications, motion pictures, radio programs, news services, and educational and orientation courses originated by the Army there are two major provisions to which the originating agencies are held responsible, namely, 1. Coverage or presentation of news or information of public events and affairs and persons in public life must be impartial and nonpartisan, and 2. If in any issue or presentation space or time is allotted to editorials or columns supporting a political party which has a Presidential candidate in at least six states, an equal amount of space or time shall be allotted in the same issue or presentation to similar matter concerning each such other political party; and (c) Any material not included in (a) and (b) above which is paid for in whole or in part with Federal funds or sponsored by the Federal Government (including the Army) must not, when considered in its entirety, contain political propaganda obviously designed to affect the result of any election for Federal office or obviously calculated to create bias for or against a particular candidate in any such election. At this date, the Democratic, Republican, Prohibition, Socialist, and Socialist-Labor Parties have a Presidential candidate in at least six states. "Sponsorship" by the Army includes the making available by the Army to members of the armed forces of any material acquired by the Army without expenditure of Federal funds; but does not include sales at or through Army exchanges or purchases by "company funds" or other nonappropriated funds.

The policies outlined in this paragraph are based on letter, The Adjutant General (AG 014.35), dated 21 August 1944, Subject "Revised instructions on dissemination to members of the armed forces of political argument or political propaganda." The letter of The Adjutant General clearly defines the War Department's policies and

interpretations concerning the law. It was given wide distribution and should be studied and understood by all personnel disseminating information to troops.

8. Other domestic political questions which are not of a partisan character may be discussed editorially by the Army press.

9. The internal military policy of the United States, including such topics as the operation of the draft, the exemption of defense workers, the pay rate of the Armed Forces, the regulations concerning commissions, the problems of civilian defense, the U-boat attack upon our shores, etc., is to be treated objectively. The facts should be accurate as far as human effort can obtain accuracy. Give troops your best information and let them draw their own conclusions.

10. In the dissemination of information to the armed forces, errors will be made from time to time, as in the most carefully conducted civilian operation. When that happens, corrections should never be made grudgingly. Always make them cheerfully, fully, and in as prominent a space as the original statement. *The prime purpose of truth in information is defeated by a dogged determination to prove one's personal infallibility.*

## *The Female Form in Army Newspapers*

This is not a military subject though it is not infrequently a subject of the military. Bathing suit "art" as well as pictures of the comparatively undraped female form are to be used at the discretion of the editor, keeping in mind that the fighting forces of the United States are not composed either of sybarites or of retarded adolescents. It is not one of the primary functions of Army information channels to provide beauty for the adornment of dugout walls. Further, within the continental limits of the United States this general subject is already so handsomely exploited by civilian periodicals that for the military to enter the competition would be like carrying coals to Newcastle. However, one cannot refrain from quoting briefly from a lengthy editorial salute by an Army newspaper at an isolated post in Alaska to a New York strip-tease artist who has posed for special pictures for their small publication. "You are the bear grease on our lupin-root cakes. You are the seal blubber in our bowl of salmon berries. You are the liver of the caribou, the egg of the sturgeon, the young gizzard of the spring ptarmigan, etc., etc.," is a touching acknowledgment of the fact that in the life of this isolated garrison, the likeness of the obliging young woman was more warming to the quonset hut than any mere coal fire.

## *The Foes We Fight*

As to Germany and Japan, it is manifest that we are fighting the rulers, the systems, the ideas, and, finally, the peoples of these countries because, in the present circumstances, they are being used in combination against us and are indivisible. We are not combatting Hitlerism only, but the combination of forces which would impose Hitlerism on our world.

Hitler is one of the symbols of this combination; yet no one symbol is to be given such exclusive attention and editorial treatment as to obscure all other forces in the combination militating against us. To instruct that Hitler wrought this evil on the world single-handedly or with the aid only of his party henchmen is to exculpate the German Army, and ignore the history of pre-war Germany. The question requires answer: If Hitler were to die tomorrow, would the forces which have put Germany at war with the greater part of humanity die with him? We know that they would not do so, because they were aiming at the same military ends before his rise to power and because they must continue to seek those same ends until they are confronted by unmistakably superior military power. Yet, in that hour, the concentrating upon Hitler as the foe we fight in Europe would become a bankrupt policy. Hence the need to continue looking beyond the symbol to the thing itself, to the nature of the forces which compose it, and to the historical roots of the matter.

Likewise, we cannot overthrow the Japanese military caste short of complete defeat of the Japanese people such as will compel them to submit to our discipline. As Ambassador Grew has stated: Even those Japanese who had friendly feelings toward the United States will fight for their Emperor to the last breath. In the eyes of the Japanese people, the Emperor is a divine being. His person is not sacred, however, from the viewpoint of the Armed Forces of the United States.

## *The Vanquished*

We have fought Italy, her rulers, fascist ideas, and, finally, her people, and have accepted her unconditional surrender. Generosity to a defeated enemy is a chivalrous attitude and is our natural impulse. But enthusiasm of expression can be reserved with respect to the Italians until their actions prove them our full-fledged allies in their revolt against fascism. Their declaration of war against the Reich carries with it the status of cobelligerent instead of full partnership with the United Nations. This may be interpreted to mean that more is expected of Italy than the gesture of surrender and the choosing



of our side. Until Italy unmistakably shows service to the cause of the United Nations, let our editorial attitude toward this late enemy be humane but not necessarily fraternal. At the same time, let us remember the meaning of "cobelligerent," and honor those men who fight alongside ours.

## *The Fighting Quality of the Enemy*

No material purpose can be served by questioning the courage or fighting quality of troops of any nation, even though they be the forces of the enemy. It was a familiar device in the AEF of 1917-18 for troops to begin circulating the rumor that they were holding down a sector "opposite the Prussian Guard" or against a storm division. The inference is plain that it was considered that giving the enemy credit for possessing great strength was an aid to morale, rather than a deterrent. That is a correct principle. To take a cheap view of the enemy is as deadly as to march straight into his fire.

The course of the present, and the records of past wars, show that the majority of men will fight bravely, even when unsuitably armed, if given a sufficient incentive. Training and tradition influence the conduct of troops in battle, and are in some degree the derivatives of national characteristics. It is largely in the measure that these conditioning factors are influenced by a national economy, politics, temperament, etc., that the quality of troops varies from nation to nation, race to race, and period to period.

Battle courage is not the exclusive asset of any one soldiery, or any one race. It is universal. Therefore, he who ridicules his foeman and makes light of his military ability and of his bravery reduces his own chance to take full measure of his opponent, and discounts his own victory even before it has been gained.

The story is told by Count Carlo Sforza that at one siege in Abyssinia, the besieged Italian soldiers put a sign above their works saying: "We, too, despise Il Duce, but you have shamed us and we intend to fight." Ridicule of the fighting quality of the defeated Italian soldier is not only detrimental to Allied propaganda abroad, but becomes a positive affront to thousands of loyal Americans of Italian stock.

It is sounder to take the view that where Italian soldiers fought badly or where they capitulated without a struggle, it was not through cowardice but because they did not believe in fighting for the cause of the Axis. Don't contribute in print to underestimation of the enemy.

# *Indoctrination of Hatred*

Whether the effort should be made to indoctrinate hatred toward the enemy must be considered a practical training question rather than a moral issue.

Since killing is the primary means by which the enemy is compelled to submit to one's own discipline, one of the ends of the training must be to so indoctrinate the soldier that he is not only willing but anxious to work bodily destruction upon the foes of his country. That state of mind is not possible unless the soldier is motivated by hatred in the hour when he is at grips with his enemy. Lacking it, the soldier lapses into that state of nonaggressiveness which is the forerunner of an inadequate battle discipline and defeat.

It does not follow that instruction in hatred, or consistent use of methods of incitement, are the means to the end in view. Such methods, if pursued recklessly, are more likely to arouse the contempt of the soldier, bring him to question the validity of his own cause, and defeat the purposes of all indoctrination. Let him once become convinced of the complete justice of his country's cause and of the malevolent character of the forces which are opposed to it as well as of their power to destroy all that he treasures, and he is mentally prepared to discharge the task at hand. As an example of the working of this principle, it is to be recalled that the military murder of Doolittle's fliers when they were prisoners of war revealed the ugly, unsoldierly side of Japan's war leaders more fully than any words that might be said about that episode. They showed themselves to be cruel, uncivilized men, still living in the dark ages, deliberately ignoring the rules of war which civilized nations have agreed to observe in their treatment of men who by the fortune of war have been captured. Their action has made the name of the Japanese army stink. It is part of our business as soldiers to see that the rank and file of the United States Army do not forget.

If in addition to being kept fully informed on subjects such as this one, the soldier is imbued with the true offensive spirit combined with a will power which will not recognize defeat, hatred will come automatically in the required degree as he moves closer to the point of impact. The objective of indoctrination, and of all information pertaining thereto, should be to harden the resolve of the soldier by winning his confidence rather than to inflame his emotions to a pitch which cannot be indefinitely sustained. This is the key to the use of the following types of information material.

## *Horror Pictures and Stories*

If properly authenticated and officially vouched for, there is no reason why horror pictures and stories should not be used, provided that they are relevant to an occurring situation, and provided that they tell a story of such cogent interest that there is no appearance of straining to make a point.

As an example of the forceful use of such material, attention is directed to the publication in the summer of 1942 of photographs of emaciated Greek civilians, either dead or dying from enforced starvation. These pictures had a thousandfold the impact of the statistical reports estimating the great numbers of Europeans who would die of starvation this year because of Nazi occupation. Moreover, they had military value because they dealt with military fact. It is a condition as yet hardly glimpsed by the United States that Hitler is deliberately employing famine as a military weapon. The absolute contrast between his declaration before the Reichstag in May 1941, that "The Greeks are the bravest people yet to oppose us," and the tragic aftermath is a striking illustration of the utter ruthlessness of the German military character, and to scruple against the use of such material at any point where a favorable opportunity is presented for the use of it would be inexcusable.

## *The United Nations*

1. The aim of all information treating of the United Nations should be to convince the Armed Forces of the United States that only military, mental, and moral unity with our Allies will bring victory. Our enemy is not one country. It is a highly integrated military mechanism made up of the total might of Germany and Japan, with their satellites and their temporary slaves in the occupied countries. We can prevail over these forces only if we train and work and discipline ourselves as a nation, and at the same time continue to build fronts with our Allies that are superior to the fronts of the enemy. "United we stand, divided we fall."

2. In the pursuit of this aim it is not necessary that information services speak of our Allies only in terms of unbounded admiration, making no mention of ways that are unlike ours, faults in the national character, or past military mistakes. Our need is not whitewash but understanding. Truth will serve the purpose if we make the effort to see them as they are—heroic peoples who have carried on against great odds, whose military purblindness in the past has never been worse than our own, whose share of this war's burdens has thus far been vastly greater than our own, and whose military cause is so

inseparably linked with ours that any hurt to their position must react violently upon us. Talebearing such as would create doubt of any Ally, rumor spreading such as would beget mutual suspicion, or the circulation of anecdotes such as develop friction between forces engaged in a common enterprise are all self-inflicted wounds. The spread of rumor is enhanced by unsubstantiated news reports. And you don't publicly criticize or doubt a member of your own team.

Questions as to the ultimate boundaries or territorial claims of other powers are generally hypothetical and often premature. An Army press and information service should not discuss, let alone pass judgment on them.

3. There is one rule that might guide all of our thinking and conduct toward the nations which fight on our side—the Golden Rule. Think and say nothing of them that we would not wish them to think and say of us. The attitude of tolerance and attempt at understanding to be sought by men and nations meeting a great emergency together might be expressed in the words of Thomas Moore's poem:

*Shall I ask the brave soldier who fights by my side  
In the cause of mankind, if our creeds agree?  
Shall I give up the friend I have trusted and tried  
If he kneels not before the same altar with me?  
From the heretic girl of my soul should I fly  
To seek somewhere else a more orthodox kiss?  
Nay, perish the men and the laws that try  
Truth, valor and love by a standard like this.*

4. This is military wisdom: Until we have done more, let us speak less of what others have failed to do; when we have done more, the matter will be of no moment. Or mutual successes not our separate failures, deserve comment.

5. One means of furthering confidence in the arms of our Allies is to be conscientious about giving them full credit for their military undertakings, and especially, to make certain that there is no deliberate distorting of facts concerning any operation in which they participate jointly with our forces. The policy of overplaying everything done by American forces and underplaying the contribution of Allied forces may be understandable in a civilian press striving for street sales and circulation, but it is unsoldierly and leads to a conceit in ourselves and contempt for those who fight beside us. He who reflects what battle success costs will not begrudge credit to the survivors.

6. Occupied states which are our Allies—the victims of Axis aggression—such as Poland, Norway, Holland, Greece, and Yugoslavia, are not to be written of as if they no longer existed as sovereign states. Their governments still live, though in exile, and they sit at the council

table of the United Nations. Their military forces and indeed their civil populations continue to fight the common battle wherever they can break free. It is vital that we build respect for the dignity and suffering of their effort.

7. The United Nations are not simply a common military front formed for the duration of hostilities. They are an alliance looking toward the solutions of the problems of the peace. The Atlantic Charter—to which all have subscribed in principle—was the first testament of that purpose. A later pledge which implements it is the Joint Four-Nation Declaration given at Moscow by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, stating among its articles that these nations “recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

## *Questions of Race and National Origin*

To contribute by act or word toward the increase of misunderstanding, suspicion, and tension between peoples of different racial or national origin in this country or among our Allies is to help the enemy!

Men of all races are fighting for the cause of the United Nations. The Chinese have been battling the Japanese since 1937. The troops of Great Britain and of Russia include men of all colors. Filipinos gave a brave account of themselves on Bataan. The other American republics allied with us in the war contain millions of colored citizens. Ten percent of our own manpower is Negro. There are thousands of men of Japanese blood serving in the Army of the United States who have already proved their devotion to this Republic. Yet the Axis Powers, including Germany with her blatant claim of inborn racial superiority, are trying to create confusion and disunity in the United Nations by lying propaganda that we are fighting a “white man’s war.” Don’t allow yourself to be drawn into an argument on this point, for argument advertises the enemy propaganda line. No more is needed than fair and full reporting of the support in factory, field, and battle given us by all races of the world.

Whenever you refer to any racial or nationality minority group, remember that they like to be thought of as ordinary people fundamentally like anybody else. They do not like to be thought of as quaint, exotic, peculiar, or curious. Avoid popular stereotypes of minorities, no matter how kindly in intent, such as grinning, singing,

dancing, happy-go-lucky, crap-shooting Negroes, or silent, unemotional, devious, and mysteriously shrewd Chinese so common in fiction. Such stereotypes are never accurate and always cause resentment. Information about minorities should emphasize the kind of activities and accomplishments about which anyone could be unreservedly proud.

Encourage friendly personal relations between different races and nationalities by occasional mention of instances of intergroup cooperation and competition in work and recreation. Reference to instances of such friendly relations, common wherever peoples meet, is often needlessly avoided through groundless fear of criticism and trouble.

Give minorities their reasonable share of attention in informational and educational media, but not so much that it looks like reform propaganda or so little that they may experience a sense of neglect. In such material there should be no semblance of lecturing, preaching, or of kindly patting on the head.

Problems of race are a proper concern of the Army only so far as they affect the efficiency of the Army, no more, no less. The Army has been given no authority for the initiation of social reform, but is charged with the sole duty of conducting its share of the war so that victory will be achieved. The work of the Army will be seriously impeded if any racial group is held back from full participation in the war effort. One of the present aims of the Army is to obtain full participation in the war effort by such groups, thus giving impetus to the democratic process. On the other hand, the Army cannot ignore or seek to change local customs where to do so would invite serious trouble. Men of all races and national origins in the Army must be encouraged and stimulated to do anything done by members of any other groups in accordance with their individual abilities.

No statement beginning "All Negroes," "All Italians," "All Chinese," "All Frenchmen," etc., is ever true!

When considering the suitability of an item concerning another race or friendly nationality group, ask yourself how you think you would like it if you were one of the people concerned. Better still, if there is a member of the other group around, ask him what he thinks about it, but be suspicious of a noncommittal answer or of one which too glibly tells you what you would most like to hear. Regard them and write about them simply as people.

## *The "Yellow" Soldier*

In view of the principles heretofore set out, it becomes clear that the term "yellow men" should not be used as a variant for Japanese. So used, it carries a connotation of opprobrium and in fact slurs all other men of that color. It is the man inside, not outside, that we must judge.

## *Our Allies—Great Britain*

As long as the war continues, and as far beyond that as the years of reconstruction may carry us, no single condition seems to be more vital for victory and the ultimate restoration of peaceful and civilized ways of life than the maintenance of an uninterrupted friendship with England. Even apart from the cold fact that we need Britain and that Britain needs us, reason and sentiment both cry aloud for ever closer cooperation and understanding. Such a friendship, based on positive realities rather than on pretty sentiment, should be active, solid, and resilient enough to absorb the inescapable strains that will be placed upon it from month to month during the years of common peril that lie ahead.

This is an imperative necessity that cannot be too strongly or too often emphasized since it may become the keystone of post-war settlement as it already has of the united war effort. Easy asseverations of good will are not enough to promote such a friendship. Every man in the forces should conceive it as part of his duty to share actively in the American end of this responsibility by seizing every chance to improve Anglo-American understanding.

Short of studying the situation at close range, this can best be done by dwelling upon the positive physical aspects of our common war effort, scorning as trivialities the surface differences that exasperate some individuals, and by recalling Franklin's famous phrase about hanging together lest we hang separately. People who have their own private reasons for not liking the British should remember that this is not their private war, and that, even if it were, Britain is not the enemy.

No other country has quite so many vital things in common with ours as Britain has. The language, 700 years of a mighty literature that belongs to both peoples, similar institutions and faiths and freedoms, religious as well as political, parallel sporting traditions—these are some of the forces that have tended to cast the two nations in the same kind of moulds. Walt Whitman said in his wise old age that "men are more like than unlike," and if he was right as to men in general without reference to their epochs, countries, tongues, or creeds, it is certainly to Americans and Britishers that we must look for the greatest degree of likeness. To the English, a Frenchman who may have lived all his life a mere 25 miles across the Channel from Dover is a "foreigner" in a sense that no American can ever be, let him come from California, New York, Georgia, indeed anywhere in the States. Conversely, even the stereotyped Englishman who bumbles in our comic strips is not regarded as alien in the same way as his French equivalent would be regarded.

This likeness is not without its dangers. While it is of more fundamental importance than the unlikenesses, and should be leaned upon and never lost sight of because of them, it should not lead us to expect miracles.

Minor disappointments and irritations seldom provoke so much misunderstanding as when they occur between the kind of close friends who have the right to expect big things of one another. A man can quarrel bitterly with his own blood brother over differences that would seem trifling in some less intimate relationship. In doing so he might even destroy their common inheritance. Our Civil War stopped short of that; but, although it saved the Union for north and south alike, it was fought with a bitterness exceeding that of most wars between nations. Fortunately we know that a Southerner no longer means anything very serious when he talks about "those damned Yankees" and that the Yankee who overhears him isn't much perturbed. All the same, even at this distance, it is safest to smile when you say that. What God creates in history man reflects in myth. At least his folkways stay cluttered with half unconscious fears and suspicions long after the historical causes of them have ceased to be current. It is therefore not a matter for surprise, remembering the old wars with Britain and the peculiar nature from the outset of the Anglo-American relationship, that some sour residue of suspicion should still remain in many American minds. Nor is it altogether strange that some Americans whose ancestry had nothing to do with the original struggle for independence are often the readiest to revive bad memories. Converts are notoriously zealous.

The common inheritance of America and Britain here and now at stake is nothing less than the democratic way of life which, with some small variations, both nations share and for which they are fighting in the same harness with the other United Nations. This is one paramount and fundamental realization that should govern the thinking of all personnel who are responsible for the informing of the armed forces. All disputes and differences arising from Anglo-American relations should yield to it. But such a recognition in no way denies that there is plenty of room between Britishers and Americans for differences in taste and temperament ranging from preferred brands of cigarettes to unpreferred brands of democracy. There are and probably always will be numerous questions and outlooks which we need not share and questions about which we can agree to disagree. Each of us has political and other business which is no direct concern of the other and which is therefore best left alone. In many matters the principle to be remembered is "Judge not that ye be not judged." It is embarrassing, on asking the question "What about the Indians?" to be answered—"Yes; isn't it too bad that they're dying out so rapidly." Nevertheless the internal problems of the British Empire (which, since



1931, when the Statute of Westminster became law, should more properly be referred to by us as the British Commonwealth of Nations) need not be treated as "out of bounds." Opinion forming elements in the Armed Forces discuss them; they are entitled to considered information about them. But a strictly objective treatment of such matters is to be counseled at all times, since here as in other spheres of knowledge, no man's opinion is better than his information. With reference to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and even Newfoundland, it is important never to forget that, although they yield allegiance to one sovereign king whom they have in common with Britain, they are, like ourselves, self-governing, independent, free democracies, that they are in this war of their own will and not as the mere satellites of England, and that they could, if they so wished, quit the fight tomorrow without asking anybody's permission.

The presentation of good battle stuff which speaks for itself (and there is no lack of such material) is the most effective means of offsetting rumor and propaganda unfavorable to Great Britain.

## *Our Allies—The USSR*

1. The military successes of the forces of the USSR in their present undertakings are at one with the successes of any other United Nations force on any other front. We will either share in their victory over the Axis or suffer by reason of their defeat.

2. An effective means toward the upbuilding of confidence in all allies is to avoid invidious comparisons between them. The overglorification of any one army cannot but reflect discredit upon other armies, encouraging the opinion that they are not doing their share. The avoidance of ideas leading to hero worship and the employment of ideas stressing military achievement are therefore consistent with the end in view.

3. It is not necessary or desirable to defend communism in order to enlist the sympathetic interest of the American soldier in the defense of the USSR. We hold for ourselves the right to determine our own form of government and cannot consistently maintain that any other people has a lesser right. Whether their present government is the kind of political system that is most satisfactory to the Russian people has been sufficiently answered by a war in which the political faith of the people as well as of the armed forces has stood the trial by fire. The Russians are under attack; they are fighting to maintain their right to determine how they shall be governed. Though we do not agree with their political ideas (and they do not believe in ours) we believe utterly in the defense of the principle for which they are fighting. Likewise, it is the defense of this selfsame principle that we stand guard against the infiltrating of communist ideas into the realm

of democracy. To quote the French philosopher: "I disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

4. The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the USSR's 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent overrunning of the Baltic Provinces were barehanded aggressions, motivated by greed for territory, or were done to strengthen the USSR's western frontiers against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the USSR defense when the attack duly fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the USSR not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker today.

5. A chief aim of Hitler's fifth-column propaganda has been to breed suspicion between America and the USSR, playing heavily on the theme of the possibility of a separate peace between the USSR and Germany. That theme was knocked out by the publication, 1 November 1943, at Moscow, of the Joint Four-Nations Declaration, signed by the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and China, which included the agreements "that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security," and "that those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy."

Thus Hitler's hope of dividing the Allies in the realm of aims and ideas has become as hollow as his hope of eventually defeating them in physical combat. The Moscow Pact, one of the strongest Allied acts of the war, recognizes as a first condition of peace the protracted cooperation of all the Allies. In view of this agreement, anything written or said that tends to alienate the USSR from the United States may be counted as a self-inflicted wound.

## *Our Allies—China*

1. The Chinese are the least known and the least publicized of our Allies. Our Armed Forces in general have developed a healthy admiration for the underequipped Ally that has resisted Japan for so long. But information is still remarkably scant, and less consideration is given developments in the Chinese war theater than in any other. This is the consequence of a national state of mind which is one of general indifference to the detail of China's fight for independent existence. Instead of accepting this situation, and treating China almost as a vacuum in the war, information services of the Armed Forces would be well-advised to consider the approaches to the problem and administer the correctives toward the end that troops will have a fuller understanding of the military nature of the Chinese struggle.

2. Toward the attainment of these ends, it is not necessary to indulge in exaggerated statements about the effectiveness of Chinese forces or the consequences of their military action. The effort should be made at all times to stay within the record. But don't ignore the record.

## *The Neutrals*

The attitude toward, and editorial treatment of, any neutral by any agency charged with providing information to the Armed Forces are to be at all times concentric and in harmony with the attitude of the United States Government.

## *Terminology*

1. There are no fine points of distinction in speaking of "German" of the "German Army" or "the Nazis" or "Hitlerites" as identifying the military forces of the Third Reich. For the purposes of the information services, they are synonymous and interchangeable. The President speaks of "Nazis" in reference both to the German fighting forces and their political support. Nazis are Hitlerites, ergo the social forces within Germany which contribute in any wise to the preservation of the present form of German government are Hitlerites. Slang names, especially diminutives suggesting that the enemy is a cute little fellow, are to be avoided.

2. The free forces fighting in Yugoslavia should be spoken of as "Yugoslav" troops, not as Serb troops.

3. The operations accounting for the presence of Allied forces in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Madagascar are "occupations" and not "conquests." The same term applies to all operations by the Fighting French or by our own forces into territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Vichy government. Speak of the "recovery" of Abyssinians' own territory or the territory of an Ally, or the territory of a British conquest or reconquest of this territory. The word "conquest" is correctly used when applied to Allied campaigns against former German and Italian territories. Military forces do not "reconquer" their own territory or the territory of an Ally, or the territory of a neutral which for strategic reasons must be taken under protective custody. They "occupy" it or "reoccupy" it.

4. The nomenclature of the enemy is to be employed with a considerable restraint and only where the word has unique value, or where it has already become of quite general usage or where the employment of it adds strength to what is being done. As examples, the term "Panzer" applies uniquely to the German organization of an armored force division, the name "Luftwaffe" is so commonly identified with the German air force that no parenthetical explanation is required, and the word "Wehrmacht" while not yet interchangeable with "Ger-

man war might" in the American consciousness, is *schrecklich* with gutturals that can be rasped in the throat with such unpleasant effect that it gives impact to any radio presentation.

5. The people of France are not to be referred to as "Vichyites," which term applies only to the governing clique. The independent French forces fighting in the United Nations' cause are the "Fighting French" and not the "Free French."

6. Speak of "Chinese" either in the singular or plural, and not of "Chinaman" or "Chinamen."

7. Speak of the "Red Army" and the "Red Navy," not the "Russian Army." Speak of "Communists" when use of the word is necessary, but of "Bolsheviks" only when using its historical connotation. Say "the USSR" or the "Soviet Union" when referring to that country as it has existed since 1917. Say "Russia" only when taking a long view of the national history, as for example "both Napoleon and Hitler have invaded Russia." It is preferable to speak of "the Battle of the USSR" rather than of "the Battle of Russia" though it is proper to speak of "the Russian language." To use "the Red Soldier" is correct; "Russian soldier" is incorrect.

8. It is "Britain" and "British," not "England" and "English," except when one speaks specifically of the area and people of that one part of the United Kingdom which is south of Scotland and east of Wales. The term "British" includes all inhabitants of the United Kingdom—Welsh, Scottish, English, and Ulstermen. The Scots prefer "Scottish" not "Scotch" except when the former are being offered a drink of the latter.

## *Security*

The safeguarding of military information is of such transcendent importance that it is all but impossible for those charged with conditioning the thinking of the Armed Forces to put too much stress upon this subject. All who are in positions of authority are counseled to greater diligence on behalf of security measures and to the exercise of greater imagination in presenting this subject to troops via all media. An unremitting campaign to produce greater vigilance and caution in all forces is one of the prime responsibilities of information service. There is no release from this responsibility until the war ends, as the subject grows in importance at the same rate that our forces become increasingly engaged in operations overseas. Our side deserves and must have all true information right up to the point where it begins to aid or comfort the enemy.

## *Balance*

News of his own battle and achievements, relayed back to the soldier via Army information services, is a tonic to his morale and a public

acknowledgment of his services. No other battle, fought elsewhere, is more important to the soldier than the action in which he himself engages. If he cannot get applause, he at least wants to be able to feel that his people are cognizant of all that he is risking and doing and he is ever prone to measure this acknowledgement in terms of the printed or publicly spoken word. Therefore, in times when the large-scale operations on the European mainland tend to monopolize national interest, it becomes more important than ever that the special reports to other theaters of operations give additional weight to the activities of our forces where the report is being sent. It is a false principle that the soldier in the Central Pacific must know best what is transpiring right around him and is therefore most anxious for news of our fortunes elsewhere. He wants to keep abreast of events, yes, but he wants most to see himself as he imagines the world is looking at him. Information so used is a positive stimulant to battle morale.

## *The Other Armed Services*

To acknowledge fully and with appreciation the achievements of the United States Navy and to credit the Marines for their victories when credit is due is the unequivocal policy of Army information services. We are not in competition with them for public acclaim; it is a good day for us when either of the sister services merits the applause of the nation. But it is our duty to make certain that our own men and women are not slighted. It is unwise for any part of Army information services to be drawn into controversies about the division of credit or blame among the services in connection with our operations. The aim should be (1) To get at the facts of Army participation (2) To state them fully and convincingly. There is never at any time any justification for any kind of a smart trick by which, through publicity, we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of one of the other services.

## *Rules of War*

The respect of the American soldier for the rules of war should be absolute. Any deviation from that standard is repugnant to the interests of the Army of the United States. Such deviations may occur under the stresses of combat. They are sometimes enlarged upon when the story is told to the home audience. It runs counter to policy for these stories to be repeated in information relayed to our forces abroad. They are, in fact, unwelcome to the combat soldier. He knows war's reality and is not particularly interested in stories of ferocity or blood-letting. They do not whip up his own ardor because he knows that he must meet his own problems as he comes to them.

# *The Foreign-Born Soldier*

When a man wears the American uniform, whatever his name or blood lines, he is an American soldier. Let the name speak for itself! We expect and receive loyalty and courageous service of our men whatever their background. To speak of a soldier as Polish-born, or of Mexican origin or of Armenian parentage, etc., is to set him apart, as if it were the unexpected to get fealty and courage from such origins. The individual in uniform does not relish any such distinction.

## *In General*

1. Information coming from enemy sources, of whatever character, is to be stated as such.

2. The propaganda of the enemy is not to be picked up and used by information services, even when it appears to serve some purpose useful to ourselves, unless the source is stated.

3. Information is to be considered "official" when it is vouched for by a ranking Government official, a ranking officer of the Armed Forces, or a Government bureau. It is not so when newspapers or radio quote it as coming from a "high official source" or from "diplomatic quarters" or from "leading strategists."

4. Let there be no more talk of war as if it were a sporting proposition fought under the Marquis of Queensberry rules. When a Japanese or a German acts sporting, it is time to smell a rat.

5. No syndicated "columns" of any sort from civilian sources will be used in soldier publications.

6. Information to the Armed Forces should be kept clean in language and in thought. Profane or suggestive words are not necessary; indeed, the use of them detracts from the force of the utterance. A press cannot but in some degree fail of its purpose if, while professing to lead and shape the thinking of others, it sets a bad moral example.

7. The tenor of an Army press should not be systematically sympathetic but should reflect at all times the high spirits and the high seriousness which are the shield and sword of the first-class fighting man. To quote what was said of the "Faith of a Soldier" by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "If it is our business to fight, the book for the Army is a war song, not a hospital sketch. It is not well for soldiers to think much about wounds. Sooner or later we shall fall; but meantime it is for us to fix our eyes upon the point to be stormed, and to get there if we can."

8. Information relating to American battle losses, the suffering of our troops, etc., is to be handled with the utmost prudence, keeping ever in mind the purpose to be served. The soldier must be kept cognizant of the nature of war. The ultimate mission of any Army is to engage and defeat the enemy, and battle losses are among the conse-

quences of that mission. But to put inordinate stress upon them is to obscure the principles of protection and of conservation of force, thereby lowering the confidence and fighting will of an Army.

9. The Army's main purpose in the treatment of its men is not to duplicate the contentments and comforts of civil life. Wherein it fails to do so, it is not falling short of any part of its mission. Its main purpose is to make soldiers. Army editors will consider that the first obligation of the military establishment towards troops is to encourage their soldierly spirit and to contribute in all possible ways to their military efficiency.

10. It should be the aim of information services to condition the thinking of the soldier to the realization that there is no reason to believe this will be a short war or that it is likely to end before there is full participation by our combat forces in the fighting abroad. Though others may speculate about the possibility of miraculous short cuts to victory, such as internal revolt within the enemy countries, it is not a suitable topic for soldiers. The only alternatives that the times admit are to stand fast or go under—there is no middle course. "As he thinketh in his heart, so is he." Let the American soldier have the truth to think about; it is good enough to keep him a good soldier and a devoted citizen.

## *Army Radio Broadcasting*

The United States Army is unique in the extent of its radio broadcast service to the armed forces. By shortwave from New York and San Francisco and by local service-operated stations overseas, information and entertainment programs are broadcast widely wherever our troops are stationed. It is axiomatic that every informational policy outlined in this guide referring to the printed word is equally applicable to the spoken word in Army broadcasting. Newscasts and other information programs transmitted over an Armed Forces Station will naturally be cleared by appropriate military intelligence authority. But mere security clearance is not enough. There is the clearance of simple good taste; the clearance of intelligent reason. The power of radio as a force to sway men's minds is beyond question. That force can work for good or ill. It can help us to understand our allies; improperly applied, it can lead us to distrust them without justice. Honest information honestly presented by radio can help to clarify in the minds of soldier-listeners the issues of World War II; false or even half-true information misdirected can confuse and distort those issues beyond all recognition.

Radio to troops has the responsibility of a voice that speaks for, and to, the Army. What that voice says must be listenable if G-I radios are not to switch it off around the world. What it says must be worth saying if it is to justify its military existence.

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